If Gary Bettman had not had his way during the contentious CBA negotiations late in 2012, early in 2013, Brad Richards would still be, in all likelihood, a New York Ranger. That’s not to say Bettman has anything personal against either Richards or the Rangers, or that he secretly wanted to see Richards suit up for his favorite NHL organization, whoever that might be (although I’d bet it isn’t the Rangers). Bettman was embarrassed by GM’s clever enough to find the loopholes in the precious salary cap system he helped to implement following the disastrous lockout that canceled the 2004 – 2005 campaign and he was hell-bent on punishing anyone who dared make a mockery of his league (i.e. him).
The salary cap was introduced as a needed measure to curb player salaries and consequently save struggling franchises while also leveling the playing field between the well-to-do teams and the not-so-well-to-do teams. The concept and design were both simple; the cap ceiling was calculated based on league-wide revenues and no team could exceed the upper limit. In order to placate the player’s union, a cap floor was implemented to insure that the poorer NHL teams would still be required to spend a minimum on player salaries rather than pocket as much profit as possible. The Average Annual Value (AAV) of a player’s contract, calculated by dividing the total compensation by the length of the SPC, was applied to each team’s upper limit. At the time, Bettman and the collection of middle-class and poorer teams which represented his base of power, reveled in the simplicity and fairness of their salary cap system.
However fiscally fortunate teams, the Rangers being one of them, soon discovered an obvious way to circumvent this version of the salary cap. With no limit on the length of a player’s contract and the calculation being based on an average rather than year-to-year salaries, a team could lower the annual cap charge by lengthening the contract to a point in which the player was unlikely to still be playing NHL hockey and fill that period with lower salaried seasons. For example a team could sign Player X (Roberto Luongo), age 31, to a 12-year contract worth $64MM with a cap charge of $5.33MM annually, that breaks down as such:
Year 1 – $10MM
Year 2 – $6.716MM
Years 3 – 8 – $6.714MM
Year 9 – $3.382MM
Year 10 – $1.618MM
Years 11 and 12 – $1MM
Chances are Player X will not be around to see the final few years, or more, of the contract and under the above scenario he will receive $57MM during the first eight seasons; a time he would have a solid chance of seeing as an NHL player. Even should he retire or leave the NHL otherwise after six seasons, he would still take home $43.5MM+, or roughly two-thirds of the total value of his contract while playing just half of its term.
Teams took advantage of the loophole and used it to sign many other top players to long-term contracts while keeping the cap hit at a manageable level. The league had no choice but to approve these contracts since they were perfectly legal under the structure of the CBA, although you knew it chapped Bettman’s hide. In fact, when he finally grew tired of it and warned teams not to violate the “spirit of the rule,” i.e. the forced suppression of player salaries, and New Jersey signed a mammoth, 15-year contract worth $100MM with winger Ilya Kovalchuk that would have paid the Russian sniper through his age-42 season, Bettman had seen enough. This was actually a re-worked agreement after the initial one was rejected by the league (under what provision in the CBA they could do that I’m not quite sure) and they elected to punish the organization for the original contract. New Jersey was forced to forfeit a first-round pick (later gifted back to them perhaps after Bettman realized what an unfair asshole he had been) and to pay a hefty fine. Bettman had drawn a line in the proverbial sand and everyone knew he was going to close that particular loophole in the next CBA. And close it is not all he did.
Instead of simply preventing teams from front-loading future contracts Bettman sought revenge against the teams that had wronged him by following the rules of the old CBA and instituted a cap recapture clause designed to force club’s to carry cap hits on players who either retired before their terms were over or were traded to other teams. Any contract entered into prior to September 15, 2012 that carried a term of seven years or more was subject to the recapture clause. One of those contracts was Brad Richards’ pact with the Rangers.
Brad Richards would have been in line to be the Rangers next Captain were it not for the vengeful actions of a pissed off, short-sighted commissioner.
Desperately seeking a #1 Center to help vault them to the top of the Eastern Conference standings, the Rangers entered the bidding for prized pivot Brad Richards in the Summer of 2011, eventually agreeing to a nine-year, $60MM deal with the veteran playmaker. The Blueshirts secured the services of Richards despite other teams reportedly besting the Rangers offer. The presence of his former coach, John Tortorella, and the chance to play for an original six club in a big market apparently won over Richards.
This was exactly the type of contract Bettman was targeting. Under the terms of Richards’ agreement with New York he would receive $57MM in the first six seasons and just $1M per in each of the final three years. Assuming Richards had played another three seasons with New York and retired following the 2016 – 2017 campaign, the Blueshirts would still have had to carry $5.67MM per season against their cap through the 2019 – 2020 season.
Even if they had found a taker via trade and Richards retired in the summer of 2017, the Blueshirts would still have had to split the recapture charge with the new club.
Penalizing teams for following the rules in place at the time is ludicrous. Imagine the company you work for eliminating casual Friday’s tomorrow and then issuing you a formal reprimand for wearing your khakis and polo shirt last week. Or the IRS fining you for a tax return filed in 2010 after changing the rules this year.
Now the Rangers avoided any potential cap recapture penalties by exercising their final compliance buyout on Richards’ contract. But the fact is the Rangers lost an important player, a top-nine center and a key leader on a team that made it all the way to the Stanley Cup Final. Richards isn’t the quality of player he was just a few years ago and his $6.6MM cap charge definitely exceeded his value on the ice but he ably filled a role on this club as a veteran mentor and experienced point-producer. Minus the repercussions of the cap recapture penalty, there is little doubt Richards would have remained a Ranger.
I can’t find fault with the Rangers for making a defensible business decision. I can’t find fault with Richards either. While he may not be the player he once was he busted his butt and was a big reason the Rangers made it to the SCF. I can blame Gary Bettman, however. Only the vindictiveness of a commissioner who failed to recognize the pitfalls of a flawed salary cap system is to blame for Richards’ departure from the team and I can’t help but feel this situation is unfair both to the team and to the player.
Source:
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